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The world of computing is undergoing changes. Network computing, using PCs, workstations,
LANs and WANs, is challenging traditional centralized data processing architectures.
This project aims at building a prototype of a heterogeneous network environment. The
problems to be studied in the project are:
Design the heterogeneous network structure and topology;
Install and run different protocols and network software;
Offer automatic routing services among different networks;
Experiment with all the standard Internet network services, such as ftp, telnet (rlogin),
SMTP and email (smail and sendmail) as well as Simple Network Management Protocol
in the heterogeneou internetworking environment in addition to NetWare services;
Design and implement a firewall as the major security mechanism in the heterogeneous
internetworking environment.
Three subnetworks running Novell’s NetWare, SunOs, BSD386 and Linux operating system
are respectively interconnected together with a gateway and a router. A set of internetworking
services such as FTP, TELNET, RLOGIN, SMTP and SNMP is offered in the environment.
A router-based filter with packet filtering mechanism is implemented as the kernel of the
firewall.
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1
1.1

In tro d u ctio n
Overview

T he world of com puting is undergoing fundam ental changes. Network computing,
using PCs, w orkstations, LAN s and WANs, is challenging traditional centralized
d a ta processing architectures.

M any com puter applications can be successfully

moved from minicomputer, mainframe, and even supercom puter platform s onto
networked PCs and w orkstations with significant cost savings and increased per
formance, flexibility and growth potential. The aggregate power of a L A N full of
PCs, w orkstations, and servers allows for the development of new applications and
user interfaces th a t would have been im practical or impossible in th e past.
A network is a system th a t interconnects computers and devices using various
m edia for the efficient use of shared resources and distributed inform ation. It is
also a tool for facilitating employee communications and conducting business in
a tim ely fashion through th e access and sharing of software and d ata. A network
reduces resource redundancy. This allows every w orkstation to use th e same program
from wherever it is located on th e network w ithout installing th e program on each
w orkstation’s disk. W ith networks, th e savings are substantial not only on software,
but on printers, disk storage devices and other expensive hardw are devices as well.
A network also brings out new problems while it gives people great convenience
and savings. Much inform ation, for example personnel files, should not be accessible
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to the general public. Account information in a bank is not expected to be shared
by every user in th e network either. In many situations, as networks grow and
are interconnected, th e d ata in one network should not be accessed by th e users in
another network. Thus, one aspect of m anagement of a com puter network, which is
essential in order to run th e network most efficiently, is how to control and secure the
network. The rapid growth of th e Internet for commercial use makes th e problem
more serious and urgent.

1 .2

T h e R e a s o n s to B u ild a L A N

A Local Area Network (L A N ) is a group of computers and peripheral devices lo
cated in a close geographic region and connected by a communication medium.
The existence of large numbers of microcomputers has been a m ajor factor in th e
development of LANs.
A Wide Area Network (W A N ) was originally implemented to make more costeffective use of large and expensive mainframe computers. Traditionally, a WAN
has a t least one or more computers central to the operation of th e network. Usually
the central com puter is a tim esharing minicomputer or a large m ainfram e com puter.
The development of a WAN focuses on specific machines. The communications in
a WAN are usually point-to-point.
In contrast, the development of a LAN focuses on connectivity. It emphasizes
th e connections of daily used devices such as microcomputers, fax machines, copy
machines and printers. It also pays more attention to the interconnections of LANs
and global networks. LANs are the currently foundations of com puterization for
alm ost every field.
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1 .3

P r o b le m S t a t e m e n t

The purpose o f this project is to establish a prototype o f a heterogeneous network
environm ent and assure security on it.
There is no doubt th a t connecting computers and other devices together makes
th e com puting environment more powerful, efficient and cost-saving. At th e same
tim e, it is also tru e th a t a cluster of networked computers is more complicated th a n
individual com puters. A network runs more software as th e interface between users
and networks. There are many more facilities to be m anaged in a network th an in
a stand-alone personal computer. It is not as easy for a system adm inistrator to
m aster th e software and d ata processing in a network as in a centralized com puter
system.
This project aims a t building a prototype of a heterogeneous network environ
m ent to show:
o W hat th e principles of networking are;
o W hat basic software networking requires;
o W hat kinds of services a network provides;
o How different protocols and internetworking software work together;
o How a network can be managed and m aintained with security.

Additionally, there are many problems arising w ith com puter internetworking. N et
work security in an internetworked environment is one of th e most im portant issues.
A prototype heterogeneous network is an ideal experimental facility for network
security problem investigation.
In summary, the problems to be studied in th e project are as follows:
o Design th e heterogeneous network structure and topology;
5

o Install and run different protocols and network software;
o Offer autom atic routing services among different networks;
o Experiment with all th e standard Internet network services, such as ftp, tel
net (rlogin), SM TP and email (small and sendmail) as well as Simple Network
M anagement Protocol (SNMPv2) in the heterogeneous internetw orking envi
ronm ent.
o Design and implement a firewall as the m ajor security mechanism in th e het
erogeneous internetworking environment.

2

A P r o to ty p e H eterogen eou s N etw ork

2 .1

D e s ig n

2.1.1

N etw o r k T op ologies

There are a variety of ways in which networks can be organized, and m ost networks
are in a constant state of change and growth. If th e com puter network has a mainsite or host com puter th a t does all d ata processing for one or more rem ote com puters,
it is a centralized network. If there are remote computers processing jobs for endusers, as well as a main-site com puter, then th a t is the beginning of a distributed
network. A distributed network can be either centralized or dispersed, b u t a network
th a t does not involve distributed processing can only be centralized since all d ata
processing is done on a main-site computer.
Several network topologies can be selected as a networking structure, such as
point-to-point (centralized), star (centralized), ring (distributed), bus stru ctu re (dis
trib u ted ) and hierarchical (distributed).
Point-to-point has only a com puter, a communications line (direct or through
th e telephone system ), and one com puter at the end of the line. This was th e earliest
6

and classical form of networks, mostly for wide area networks, and is undoubtedly
not sophisticated enough to be the network topology for the network environm ent
under consideration.
A star network, or centralized network, is one in which prim ary com puting is
accomplished a t a single site, with each rem ote site w orkstation entering th e central
system via a single communication line. Although a star network may have other
powerful com puters at th e end of its communication lines, it is not a good stru ctu re
to show distributed processing on a LAN w ithout an extremely powerful com puter.
A ring network is organized by connecting com puters in a closed loop. Each
node is only linked to those adjacent on th e right and th e left. Hence, th e maximum
distance a ring network covers is far larger th a n th a t of other topologies such as the
bus topology. Advantages of a ring network are th a t it can be run at high speeds
and th a t th e mechanisms for avoiding collisions are simple. But a ring topology
does not have th e flexibility th a t bus structures have and often carries a high price
tag. Ring networks sometimes use token passing schemes to determine which node
may have access to the communications system.

Token Ring (IE E E 80S.5) and

Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) which use double ring connection are well
known networks using ring topology.
A bus network is configured with branches extending from a central backbone.
As a signal traverses th e bus — normally a coaxial, fiber optic or tw isted pair cable
— th e connection listens for the signal th a t carries an address designation. The
products of bus systems, such as ETH ER N ET, are th e least expensive and most
commonly used. Signal collision and signal attenuation limit th e range covered by
th e bus topology network. The bus structure of ET H ER N ET is chosen as th e LAN
topology for this study.
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A hierarchical network represents a fully distributed network, in which com puters
feed into com puters, which in tu rn feed into other com puters. The computers used
for rem ote devices may have independent processing capabilities and draw upon the
resources a t higher or lower levels as information or other resources are required. A
hierarchical network is one form of a completely distributed network.

2 .1.2

N etw o r k P ro to c o ls

A protocol is a set of rules th a t coordinates th e exchange of messages between
partners. Standards for establishing a network benefit th e users of com puter network
and communications protocols. They force m anufacturers to consider quality rather
than “gimmicks” .
To establish a network standard, the International Organization for S tandard
ization provides a seven-layer reference model (OSI reference model). At present,
this model is generally used as a framework to describe protocol characteristics and
functions. The im portance of th e reference model is th a t it perm its various net
works of th e same or different types to communicate easily w ith one another as
if they constituted a single network. The layering is based on th e principle th a t
any layer may use th e services of the layer below it w ithout knowing how th e layer
below provides these services. The layer above offers specific services of its own.
In a layered architecture, each system is viewed as a logical composition of a set
of subsystems. Subsystems th a t are adjacent to one another in the vertical hierar
chy communicate through their common boundary. W ithin each subsystem or layer
are entities. W hen a com puter communicates, it passes messages between adjacent
layers. Each layer, in this OSI model, defines a layer or level of functions. The
lower-level im plem entation can be hidden to achieve com patibility a t some higher
levels. It allows the im plem entation to be focused on its own level functions.

‘ Practically, network architecture varies in several layers in term s of this sevenlayer model. Both IPX and T C P /IP are layered protocol suites. Their purpose
is to provide a set of communication protocols th a t are m anufacturer-independent.
W hen two com puters are going to communicate, they break their messages down
into manageably sized packets, then send these packets across th e network in a
form at th a t other computers can understand and decode.
IP X , th e Novell NetW are protocol, which stands for Internetwork Packet E x
change, supports connectionless datagram delivery. Corresponding to th e Network
layer of th e OSI model, this protocol performs addressing, routing and switching to
deliver a packet to its destination. D atagram delivery is not guaranteed, but IPX
packets are correctly received about 95 percent of the time. The layer above IPX is
responsible for error control and reassembling th e packets in correct order.
T he motive for developing T C P /IP (Transm it Control P ro to co l/In tern et P ro to 
col), is to broaden the base of hardw are and software from which to choose for the
purpose of competitive binding, rath er th an be com mitted to a proprietary network
ing system. T C P /IP is a set of protocols unrelated to th e physical and d a ta link
layers. It can be implemented on top of any physical d a ta communication medium.
T C P provides th e packet sequential, error control and other services required to
provide reliable end-to-end communications. IP takes the packet from T C P and
passes it through whatever gateways are needed for delivery to the rem ote T C P
layer through the rem ote IP layer.
Figure 1 shows the structures of these two protocols comparing the ISO ’s OSI
reference model.
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Figure 1: T he comparison of three protocols — T C P /IP , IPX and ISO’s OSI.
Compared with th e OSI seven-layer model, the lowest two layers of IPX and
T C P /IP are th e same. For the network layer in OSI, NetW are and UNIX T C P /IP
are accomplished by IPX and IP, respectively. For th e tran sp o rt layer in th e OSI
model, NetW are offers SPX and UNIX T C P /IP offers T C P and UDP. NetW are has
no functions in the session layer of OSI model, while UNIX T C P /IP has R PC (Re
m ote Procedure Call). For the presentation and application layers in OSI model,
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NetW are provides NCP as well as User Shell correspondly and UNIX T C P /IP pro
vides NFS, Telnet, FT P, SMTp and SNMP across these two layers.

2 .1 .3

N etw o r k and N etw o rk O p eratin g S y ste m

W hen designing a LAN, before connecting all computers and related resources to 
gether, it m ust first be determined in which way it is to be used, w hat kind of
protocols to use for transm itting d ata, w hat kind of network operating system to
use for control of th e network, and which networking services to be offered.
There are two m ajor LAN software design configurations. One is peer-to-peer
and the other is client-server. In a peer-to-peer network architecture, any com puter
may make a request of any other computer. There is no dedicated file server, nor any
machine dedicated to only one task. Peer-to-peer is usually considered suitable only
for wide area networks. The largest network in the world, th e Internet, works with
the peer-to-peer m ethod for internetworking. In a client-server network architecture,
client machines make requests of another machine called th e server. Both methods
are used in different networks in the prototype networking environment under study.
W hen looking for a typical client-server model, NetW are is an easy choice. Nov
ell’s NetW are running IPX protocol is one of th e most widely used local area net
work (LAN) software in th e business world. Novell NetW are (but not NetW are Lite)
uses the client-server architecture based on PC and UNIX clients requesting services
from the NetW are file server and print server. NetW are is m ature, robust and priced
reasonably for th e IBM PC compatible environment. It can also be conveniently
connected to other popular internetworking protocols.
On the peer-to-peer side, T C P /IP and related protocols running on numerous
rem otely located LANs are the base of the information super highway. Millions
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of com puters and networks are interconnected into the Internet running T C P /IP
protocols. UNIX is a popular, sophisticated and complete operating system. W ith
the development involving so much tim e and so many people, it provides m any
network services. UNIX along with th e aforementioned related network products
can work in a peer-to-peer architecture.
A nother reason to choose these two kinds of network software is th a t IPX and
T C P /IP are th e two m ajor and most representative network protocols in th e com
puter and network industry. Also, using these two protocols makes th e environm ent
a heterogeneous network.
Using two different protocols creates a crucial problem — how to communicate
between the two. Fortunately, NetW are allows operating two protocols on one n et
work interface card. NetW are version 3.1x and 4.x support T C P /IP in four ways:

o A NetW are file server can act like a UNIX server:

Running NetW are Network File System (N FS) lets UNIX w orkstations hook
up to a NetW are server and access th e files on a server’s hard drive.
o A NetW are file server can act as a router for an IP network:
The NetW are server will behave like an IP router if users install th e TCPIP.N LM
and connect the server to an IP network. The server can route between mul
tiple IP networks or between a NetW are network using the IPX protocol and
a UNIX network running T C P /IP using two network interface cards.
o NetW are LAN W orkPlace and LAN WorkGroup allow D O S w orkstations to

talk to a UNIX server:
LAN W orkPlace allows users to send d a ta across an IP network connection to
a distant NetW are server.
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o N etW are can sneak NetW are packets across an IP network with th e IP tu n 
neling feature:
Using th e IP tunnel feature, a NetW are server can communicate w ith a second
NetW are server across an IP backbone. The tunnel feature sends the NetW are
IPX packets across the IP backbone embedded in IP packets.

W ith these m ethods, heterogeneous networks can run both IPX and T C P /IP at
the same tim e simply and smoothly.

2 .2

I m p le m e n t a t io n

2.2.1

P h y sic a l C o n n ectio n s

According to the layered network structure, the lowest level is a hardw are base for
a network, which defines the physical fink between computers and networks. In
addition to com puters which run everyday applications, network interface cards and
transm ission m edia — cables are needed for th e connection.
A network interface card (NIC) installed in a com puter links a com puter, w hether
functioning as a file server, w orkstation or gateway, to a network or another com
m unication device. A socket at th e back of a card provides a connection to any
network cable. There are many different kinds of network cards which are usually
independent of com puter type, network protocols and higher layer network software.
Each card has its own driver. Almost every operating system has built-in drivers
for most widely used cards to simplify the installation. Generally speaking, there
are three basic steps to install a network card: First, insert a card into a com puter;
Second, load its own driver; Third, activate th e driver and modify the operating
system to recognize th e card. In th e experimental network, four types of NICs are
used: an S-bus ETH ER N ET card for a Sun 3-110 w orkstation, an SMC Elite 16
13

ETH ER N ET card (W estern Digital 8003 compatible) for a 486 running BSD 386
UNIX, NE2000 network cards for a 486 running Linux and PC 286s, and NE2000
compatible cards for th e NetWare Server, an intel 386 com puter.
A variety of media are used to provide LAN communication services. The most
common are tw isted pair copper cables and coaxial cable (for either baseband or
broadband). As th e engineering problems involved in using fiber optics have been
resolved, this technology has been gaining popularity and will probably overtake
coaxial cables as th e main stream medium. However, there is no single best tra n s
mission medium. The selection of a medium is dependent on the use. Twisted pair
cable (lObaseT) is usually wired in a star p attern with a repeater hub in th e center
of the star and w orkstations a t th e end of the tentacles. Fiber optic cable has been
limited to th e high-speed and high-security installations because of th e high cost of
m aterials and installation. Coaxial cable is mostly used in bus topology networks.
Thin coaxial cable (10base2) is cheaper and computers are more easily connected.
A com puter or other network device can be attached to th e bus cable through a Tconnector at th e back of its NIC. One term inator is attached to each end of th e bus.
This configuration may become irritating when problems occur because it is very
difficult to isolate problems on a bus. Because of the resource availability, coaxial
cable is used for the experiment.

2 .2 .2

H ard w are A rch itec tu re and N etw o rk C onfigu ration

To dem onstrate how different kinds of software (such as router, gateway, Simple
Network M anagem ent Protocol (SNM P), etc.) and different types of protocol work,
a limited number of computers are divided into three groups as three LANs. A
router and a gateway are used to connect the three LANs together. Figure 2 shows
th e hardw are architecture and network configurations.
14
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Figure 2: The Hardware Architecture and Network Configuration for Three In
ternetw orked LANs.
The configuration for each node is as follow:
The Sun w orkstation works as a node. The network card comes with th e work
station which uses default I/O base address and default interrupt.
The NetW are Server which is a PC386 works as a gateway between network 1
and network 2. It uses two NE2000 compatible cards. The. first is a YCL card with
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I/O base address 0X340 and IRQ 2. The second is an AE-200JL-N w ith I/O base
address 0X300 and IRQ 3
A 486 PC works as a router between network 2 and network 3. It has two NE2000
cards attached. The configuration of one card is 0X340 for I/O base address and
IRQ 3. The other uses 0X360 for I/O base address and IRQ 5.
The BSD com puter is a 486 PC th a t works as a node. The SMC network card
is installed, on which the I/O base address is 0X280 and IRQ is 3
Two 286PCs work as N etW are’s clients.

They both use NE2000 cards with

default configuration, I/O base address 0X300 and IRQ 3.

2 .2 .3

S oftw are C o m p o n en ts and C onfigu ration

T he basic networking requirement of th e experimental project is th a t the network
software and th e internetworking software run seamlessly in th e environm ent to
provide enhanced routing, security and m anagem ent functions in addition to all
standard network services. Three UNIX w orkstations, running BSD386, Linux and
SunOS, and a NetW are LAN, including a server and several PCs running MS-DOS
and MS-Windows, are organized into three networks as in Figure 3.
Network 1 is a client-server LAN, running NetW are 3.12 with both IPX protocol
and T C P /IP protocol. IPX communication protocol is used to connect clients to
the NetW are server. The T C P /IP protocol functions on the server to connect it to
the other two LANs. Client applications on MSWindows and on MSDOS such as
rconsole, login etc. are installed in the two PC clients.
Both network 2 and network 3 are peer-to-peer networks running UNIX-based
software. Network 2 includes a Sun workstation running SunOS, a 486 PC running
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Linux and th e NetW are server (the gateway to network 1). Network 3 is comprised
of a 486 PC running BSD 4.3Net2 and the Linux 486 (the router to network 2).
The T C P /IP is chosen as the network protocol on network 2 and network 3. The
NetW are server works as a gateway between network 1 and network 2, and th e 486
PC with Linux functions as a router between network 2 and network 3.

NetWare

Linux

gateway

Firewall

router

150.131.251.10

150.131.252.10

Pcware

150.131.252.111

Netware

IPX

Darkstar

TCP/IP

TCP/IP

TCP/IP

150.131.250.111
Linux
TCP/IP

TCP/IP
IPX

IPX

TCP/IP

150.131.252.112
Fusion
NetWare

NetWare

Client

Client
SunOS

Subnetwork 1

Subnetwork 2

150.131.250.110
Bsd

BSD 4.3Net2

Subnetwork 3

Figure 3: The configuration and connection of a prototype internet w ith three sub
networks.
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To make the internetworked networks communicate smoothly, an IP address
should be assigned to each computer and a routing table should be set up on each
node. On th a t basis, higher level protocols and facilities can run.
There are several levels of addressing required for T C P /IP :

o An application port address or port number.
o An Internet address used by IP.
o A hardw are network address which uniquely identifies each network interface
card and is assigned by the card m anufacturer.

A port number is used for addressing at the T C P and UDP (User D atagram P ro to 
col) level (UDP is th e connectionless counterpart of T C P ), which is a 16-bit field.
Different application have different p ort numbers. A host com puter m ay theoreti
cally establish up to 65535 different T C P connections concurrently. T C P uses port
numbers to identify th e ultim ate destination within a machine.
UDP also uses port numbers for addressing, but T C P and UDP p ort num bers are
independent. Usually, th e designers have chosen to use th e same integer port number
for any service th a t is accessible from both UDP and TCP. The interface between
T C P and the user accessing an Internet application is through th e p o rt address
on the host node. The combination of p ort and global network addresses uniquely
identifies a process within an environment of multiple networks and multiple hosts.
Some services, such as F T P and rwho, are assigned reserved or well known port
numbers. The port numbers assigned in a UNIX system can be found in th e file
/etc/services.
For internetworking to take place, IP must be able to route according to the
global Internet address specific to each node. An Internet address or IP address
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is a four-byte address assigned to each network device. IP addresses are globally
unique and hardware-independent. They are designed to facilitate the process of
routing packets from one network to another so th a t machines on different physical
networks can communicate with each other.
An IP address is four bytes long and is divided into a network portion and a
host portion. The network portion identifies a logical network to which th e address
refers. Routing decisions are made on this inform ation. The host portion identifies
a machine on th a t network.
There are three classes of IP addresses: A, B and C. They differ in th e way th a t
bytes are allocated between the host and network portions. If th e network portion
of an address is denoted by N, and host portion by H, class A addresses interpret
th e bytes as N.H.H.H, class B as N.N.H.H and class C as N.N.N.H. The class of an
address can be determined by examining its first byte. The first byte of class A is
between 1 and 126, th a t of class B is from 128 to 191 and th a t of class C is from
192 to 223. 127 is for loopback. Class A and B addresses are usually subdivided in
a special way: subnetting, in which a p art of th e host portion of an address is used
to extend th e network portion. For example, the four bytes of a class B address
would norm ally be interpreted as N.N.H.H. After subnetting is used to assign th e
th ird byte to th e network number rath er th an th e host num ber, th e address would
be interpreted as N.N.N.H. This turns a single class B address into a class C like
address. In this way, a mask 255.255.255.0 instead of 255.255.0.0, is used in this
p ro ject.
In the UNIX system, ifconfig is used to assign th e IP address, mask and broad
casting address to an interface card. In NetW are, command bind is used to assign
the IP address. Since IP addresses are long, seemingly random numbers, they may
be difficult to remember. Almost every system allows tex t names to be associated
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with an IP address, which are defined in the file /e tc/h o sts.

2 .2 .4

P C b ased S oftw are R o u tin g and G atew ay

In many organizations, LANs cannot operate independently. They m ust be finked
either to other LANs or to a WAN. Different kinds of LANs have different implica
tions for interoperability. LANs are particularly im portant in th a t it is a LAN th a t
m any w orkstations are connected to as th e first stage in a distributed networking
and computing environment. However, LANs can rarely exist independently of large
networks, particularly in large organizations. The appropriate solution to connect
LANs is to use a gateway or router. ‘G atew ay’ has become th e term used to des
ignate the hardw are and software necessary to make two technologically different
networks communicating with one another. Thus, a gateway needs to execute a
conversion of protocols. The term router is often used to denote th e hardw are and
software necessary for two physical networks using th e same or similar technology
to communicate.
Both gateways and routers provide all interconnections among physical networks
and switch packets between different sections of the network. They operate at the
IP level and are capable of making routing decisions based on inform ation in routing
tables. There are dedicated hardw are routers with very high performance as well as
an extremely high price. However, a host com puter with appropriate software can
also accomplish routing .
In the software based router, routing is the process of directing a packet through
th e p ath of networks th a t provide the link between its source and destination. R out
ing inform ation is stored in a table in the kernel. Each table entry has several pa
ram eters, including a reliability field th a t determines routes when th e table contains
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conflicting inform ation. -To route a packet to a particular address, th e kernel picks
the m ost specific of the available rules. If there is no relevant route and no default,
a “network unreachable” error is returned to th e sender.
Packets come in on one interface card and are either delivered locally or compared
to the routing table to determine where they should be forwarded. The difficult p art
is to make sure th a t the routing table contains th e right data. The IP routing , which
is determ ined by searching th e routing table and deciding which interface to send
a packet out, is a routing mechanism. This differs from a routing policy, which is a
set of rules th a t decides which routes go into th e routing table.
The m aintenance of routing tables can be done statically, dynamically or with
a com bination of th e two approaches. A static route is one th a t can be entered
explicitly using th e command route. Static routes should stay in th e routing table
forever. This m ethod is very inflexible in respect to changes in th e network config
uration. Dynamic routing is performed once every 30 seconds by a daemon process
th a t m aintains and modifies th e routing table. Routing daemons on different hosts
com municate to discover th e topology of th e network and to figure out how to reach
distant destinations. In the UNIX environment, th e processes th a t m aintain and
update routing inform ation are two daemon processes, routed and gated, based on
the well known Routing Inform ation Protocol (R IP ) and Open Shortest Path First
Protocol (OSPF). In addition, ICM P redirection can also add a route entry into th e
routing table.
In this network prototype, routed runs on th e SunOS, BSD and the NetW are
server ( routed param eter is set in the “on” position) to dynamically m anage the
routing table as well as establishing static entries when machines are started . In the
Linux com puter, a static routing table is used and managed manually.
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2 .3

N e t w o r k S e r v ic e s a n d N e tw o r k M a n a g e m e n t

Much of th e im petus for the development of T C P /IP is th e need for internetworking
services — th e ability of an end-user to communicate through a local machine to
some rem ote machine or rem ote end-users. The traditional T C P /IP services are
supported by th e appropriate protocols, such as:

o The File Transfer Protocol (F T P ), which allows the transfer of files from one
com puter on th e Internet to another com puter on th e Internet.
o T he Network Terminal Protocol (T E L N E T ), which provides a means for al
lowing a user on th e Internet to log onto any other com puter on th e network.
o Simple M ail Transfer Protocol (SM T P ), which allows users to send messages
to one another on th e Internet.
o In a T C P /IP Internet, IP routers form th e active switches th a t m anagers need
to examine and control. The M anagement Inform ation Base (M IB ) based
SN M P and SN M Pv2 are th e prevalent network m anagem ent protocols.

Each of th e services implied by these protocols is offered by this internetworking
prototype except SNMPv2
To use F T P , T C P port 21 is fixed as the command channel and T C P p ort 20 as
the d a ta channel. In th e UNIX system, the protocol consists of ftp and the server
daemon process ftpd.
F T P differs from other file transfer program s in many respects. The m ost promi
nent differences include the use of separate channels for control inform ation and d a ta
and the fact th a t F T P d ata transfers do not run in th e background (work w ithout
a spooler). Now F T P is available for each node running UNIX software to transfer
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files between each other.
T E LN E T is intended to provide access, in th e form of a term inal session, to a
com puter connected to the network. The TELN ET service is attached to T C P p ort
23. UNIX processors currently incorporate th e command rlogin, which offers almost
the same functionality as TELN ET but provides b etter support for th e UNIX envi
ronm ent. Both TELN ET and RLOGIN run on th e prototype networks smoothly.
F T P and TELN ET are configured in the file /etc/services and /etc/p assw d .
T C P p o rt 25 is defined for SMTP. Like F T P and TELN ET, SM TP is desirable
for its simplicity. It incorporates many features of FTP.
In the UNIX system, SM TP is implemented by th e program sendmail. This
is a very complex program which can communicate with mail services other th a n
SM TP and which, to some extent, also operates as a gateway between different
mail systems. It is possible for sendmail to function only as an SM TP server, but
also as an SM TP client. However, users never use sendmail directly, b u t usually
pine or mail, which controls and simplifies th e processing of a message. Sendmail
is only actived to forward th e message. If forwarding is not immediately possible,
the message is entered into an output queue. Regular attem pts are then m ade to
forward th e messages from there to th e destination.
A configuration file, sendmail. cf, is used to control sendmail, which makes the
program very adaptable. In addition to the definition of th e local-mail-forwarding
program and many other uses, this file also contains the commands for converting
the address for th e connected mail system. File aliases, which may be used to create
distribution lists and for forwarding requests, is edited and then converted into an
indexed database using th e command newaliases. Abas names m ay also be used to
send a message to a program , for example, to set up an autom atic answering service.
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The prototype networks provide complete email services.
As th e size of networks increases, network m anagem ent becomes an increasing
challenge.

The task of network management is to m onitor th e elements of the

network in order to identify malfunctions, faults or stru ctu ral changes a t an early
stage and to take countermeasures. In some network architectures, this also includes
the control of access to the network and the allocation of inform ation for metered
accounting.

The basis for th e Internet activities in this area is Simple Network

M anagement Protocol (SN M P), which is based on the m anager/agent paradigm .
SNMP is used by a m anager which accesses d a ta in th e m anagem ent inform ation
base (MIB) implemented in th e agent.
SNMP on NetW are is autom atically loaded when TCP.NLM is started.

3
3 .1

N etw ork S ecu rity
G en eral A pproach

Almost all network software provide ways of m aintaining network security and sys
tem integrity. Network security falls into three broad sets. The first set focuses on
the problems of authorization, authentication and integrity. The second set focuses
on the problems of privacy, and th e third set focuses on th e problems of availability
by controlling access, i.e. to guarantee th a t outsiders cannot prevent legitim ate d a ta
access by saturating a network with traffic.

3 .1.1

A u th e n tic a tio n , A u th o riza tio n and D a ta In te g rity

A uthentication is the process of verifying identification. Many servers are configured
to reject a request unless th e request originates from an authorized client. When
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a client first makes contact, th e server must verify th a t th e client is authorized
before granting services. Authorization involves determining w hether a user has
legitim ate access to a resource and allowing the owner of a resource to define who
has w hat type of access to the resource. In an unsecured network environment,
such as th e Internet, w ithout reliable authentication and authorization mechanisms,
many services are unavailable.
There are a variety of authorization schemes. Access control is widely used.
Access control lets network managers restrict the use of specific files, directories,
and printers. All access control software require users to identify themselves with
a password before they can launch applications. The most popular package offers
audit trails to m onitor user activity including which systems and files they have
used, autom atically logs users off the network, and prevents im portant system files
(such as CONFIG.SYS and AUTOEXEC.BAT) from being altered. T h at feature is
particularly valuable because those files contain th e commands to run th e security
package. Some access control packages lock up the PC if they detect th a t systems
files have been modified.
M ost access control packages generate and store audit trails, which give network
managers a way to m onitor system activities. Some products only indicate when a
user logged on and off. O ther packages also indicate which files were opened and
closed.
Knowing th a t an audit trail exists and th a t changes can be traced back is often
enough to discourage anyone tem pted to tam per with data.

B ut it is useless if

changes can be made under another user’s name, which can be accomplished easily
enough if employees walk away from their machines while they are logged on . To
guard against this sort of problem, m ost access control packages clear th e screen
and lock th e keyboard when a PC has remained idle for a predefined period. Once
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a screen has been blanked, th e user must enter a password to regain control of th e
keyboard.
At present, authentication provides an easier way to adm inister passwords and
user IDs. Users can be required to change passwords periodically and choose pass
words th a t have a minimal length and some kind of combination of uppercase, lower
case letters and digits. A uthorization also makes it possible to encrypt passwords
before they are sent over a network or stored to disk.
D ata integrity ensures th a t d ata have not been altered or destroyed in an unau
thorized m anner.

3 .1 .2

E n cry p tio n and Kerberos

A prim ary m ethod used to thw art passive hole is th e use of encryption technique to
make the inform ation unusable w ithout possession of th e decoding key. Encryption
is accomplished through th e use of either a code or a cipher.

W ith a code, a

predefined table substitutes a meaningless word or phrase for each message or p art
of a message. A cipher, in contrast, uses a computable algorithm th a t translates a
bit stream into an indecipherable cryptogram . Cipher techniques can often be more
readily autom ated, and are therefore used more frequently in com puter and network
security systems.
W ith conventional encryption, the original d ata, or plain tex t, are converted
into an unintelligible ciphertext. The conversion is accomplished using an algorithm
and a key composed of a bit string th a t controls the algorithm. The key m ust be
in the possession of both th e sender and receiver, so key m anagem ent becomes an
issue. The algorithm m ust be sufficiently powerful to preclude decipherment of the
message based solely on th e ciphertext.
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From a network perspective, there are two fundam ental types of encryption: link
and end-to-end. Link encryption implies th a t d ata are encrypted independently on
each vulnerable communication link. The task of key m anagem ent is th e control of
key selection and key distribution in a cryptographic system. A key is a piece of
digital inform ation th a t interacts with encryption algorithms to control encryption
of inform ation. The classical approach to encryption/decryption was to use a sym
m etric algorithm , in which both the sender and receiver of an encrypted message
were required to have th e same key. The disadvantage of symmetric algorithm s is
th a t for security, th e algorithm as well as th e key must be kept secret. Moreover,
the key m ust be communicated from one person to another, thus creating a security
th rea t. A m ajo r advantage, however, is th a t some system of authentication can be
established so th a t problems involving bogus inform ation can be reduced.
The sophistication o f th e algorithms has increased over th e years. The newer
alternative methodology uses an asymmetric system. Public key encryption is th e
outgrow th of this development. Instead of one key, PKC (Public-Key C ryptograph)
has two keys, one public and the other private. Moreover, it is impossible to deduce
th e private key from the public key. A person with th e public key can encrypt a
message but not decrypt it — only someone with th e private key can decrypt the
message. PKC algorithms are complicated protocols, not ideally suited to encrypt
long messages. A common implementation is to use PKC to transfer th e key for
another cryptographic algorithm and then use th a t algorithm to encrypt and decrypt
messages.
The advantage of an asymmetric system is th a t th e second, private key is known
only to the receiver who calculates it. In such a system, th e encryption/decryption
algorithm s and th e encryption (public) key may be made public. The decipherment
key is related to the encipherment key, but is actually a random sample of one of a
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large universe of potential key values.
Kerberos is an add-on authentication system th a t delivers a higher level of secu
rity th a n afforded by passwords and access control. In effect, Kerberos is commonly
used on the Internet: it has also been adopted by OSF as p art of its distributed
com puting environment.
Kerberos — nam ed for th e three headed watchdog th a t guarded th e gates of
Hades in Greek mythology — relies on three components to w atch over th e network
security: a database, authentication server, and ticket-granting server (TG S). All
three components sit on a single, physically secured server th a t is connected to the
network.
The Kerberos database contains all network user names, their passwords, the
network services to which each user has access, and an encryption key associated
w ith each service. The database is th e only place on th e network where passwords
are stored.
The Kerberos authentication server ensures th a t the person requesting a network
service, such as access to an application on a host, is actually authorized.

The

ticket-granting server, as its nam e suggests, issues “tickets” to th e user once the
authentication server has verified identity. To access an application a user needs
both a ticket and a second credential, called an authenticator, which is issued by
th e client w orkstation. An authenticator consists of th e user nam e, th e IP address
of a w orkstation, and th e time th a t a request originates.

3 .1 .3

F irew alls

T oday’s networked world has grown from the bottom up, with millions of new con
nections originating from personal computers and small networks. We connect our
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organizations’ networks to thousands of other com puter networks. It is no longer
possible to know who or w hat is on the other end of a network connection unless we
take extraordinary measures. W ith much more at risk, we m ust protect our d ata
and networks with stronger mechanisms th a n mere passwords. Mechanisms th a t
control th e Internet access handle th e problems of screening a particular network or
an organization from unwanted communication. Such mechanisms can help prevent
outsiders from: obtaining inform ation, changing inform ation or disrupting commu
nication on an organization’s internal internet. Unlike authentication and privacy
mechanisms, which can be added to an application programs, internet access control
usually requires changes to basic components of the internet infrastructure.
A single technique has emerged as th e basis for internet access control. The
technique places a block known as an internet firewall at th e entrance to th e part
of the internet to be protected. A firewall partitions an internet into two regions,
referred to informally as th e inside and outside. Actually, a firewall examines all in
coming and outgoing messages and blocks all unauthorized communication between
com puters in the inside and the outside.
The firewall — a gateway or router through which all connections are m ade —
offers another layer of security against intruders getting into th e network. Inform a
tion technology also provides a facility th a t could m onitor and restrict employees
exchanging inform ation with outside world. Internet firewalls have their roots in
control mechanisms and security measures th a t have long been standard practice in
th e m ainframe community.
Firewalls can be built in several ways, using a variety of mechanisms. There are
three of them in common use:
o Router-based filters, or informally called packet filters.
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M ost routers include a high-speed filtering mechanism.

It is th e simplest

approach to create a firewall using a program m able router. In this way, a
system m anager can further control packet processing, besides offering norm al
routing. T h at is, the m anager can specify how th e router should dispose of
each packet. W hen a packet first arrives, th e router passes th e packet through
its packet filter before performing any other processing. If th e filter rejects
the packet, th e router drops it immediately. A packet filter forms th e basis for
building block of a firewall - the kernel of a firewall.
o Host com puter gateways, or bastions.
An alternative approach is to use a com puter instead of a router, which is called
a bastion host. This offers many more capabilities, including th e ability to log
all th e activity over th e gateway. This bastion host com puter is a connection
between inside and outside networks. It has two conceptual barriers. T he outer
barrier blocks all incoming traffic except packets destined for services on th e
bastion host th a t th e organization chooses to make available externally, and
packets destined for clients on th e bastion. T he inner barrier blocks incoming
traffic except packets th a t originate on the bastion host. Each barrier requires
a router th a t has a packet filter. While router-based firewall m onitors d a ta
packets a t th e IP level, hosts exert their control a t an application level, where
traffic can be examined more thoroughly.
o A separate and isolated network.
This m ethod is similar to the bastion system. Instead of interposing a bastion
host com puter we create another network, an isolated subnetwork th a t sits
between th e external and internal networks. Typically, this network is config
ured so th a t both the external and internal networks can access it, but traffic
across th e isolated network is blocked. One advantage of isolated networks is
th a t they can also simplify the establishment and enforcement of new Internet
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addresses, especially for large private networks th a t m ay otherwise face the
prospect of having to undergo significant reconfiguration.

In this project, packet filter is selected as the network firewall model. It solves the
problem in two aspects: to perm it a m anager to configure separate filter actions for
each interface, and to combine packet filtering with existing router.

3.2

A R ou ter-b ased Firew all U sing P acket-filtering

Routers work by controlling traffic a t the IP level, selectively passing or blocking
d a ta packets based on source/destination address or port inform ation in th e packet’s
header. M any commercial routers offer a mechanism th a t augm ents norm al routing
and perm its a m anager to further control th e packet processing. Informally called
a packet filter, th e mechanism requires th e managers to specify how th e router
should dispose of each datagram . Some routers perm it a m anager to configure all
interfaces, usually specifying datagram s on th e IP address, protocol, source protocol
port num ber, and destination protocol p ort number.
To be effective, a firewall th a t uses datagram filtering should restrict access to all
IP sources, IP destinations, protocols, and protocol ports except those computers,
networks, and services th e organization explicitly decides to make available exter
nally. A packet filter th a t allows a manager to specify which datagram s to adm it
instead of which datagram s to block can make such restrictions easy to specify.
The problem with the router-based approach stems from th e variety of different
protocols which are used on th e Internet.
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3.2.1

S oftw are D esig n and Im p lem en ta tio n

The Linux operating system supports T C P /IP communication protocol and also
allows a com puter running Linux to be configured as a router. It is possible to
implement a router-based packet filter on the existing router. To take advantage of
the Linux routing software,and to make th e im plem entation more structured and
easy to use, th e packet filter is separated into two parts: One is th e modification of
the Linux IP software which manages th e packet routing in th a t some new functions
are added to control th e packets’ forwarding; The other is a utility th a t allows users
to specify their packet routing rules, th a t is how to process every arriving packet.

1. The Linux packet routing software.
The goal of packet routing is to provide a virtual network th a t encompasses
multiple physical networks and offers a connectionless datagram delivery ser
vice. IP routing chooses a p ath over which a datagram should be sent. Loosely
speaking, the routing is divided into two forms: direct delivery and indirect
delivery. Direct delivery, the transm ission of a datagram from one machine
across a single physical network directly to another, is th e basis on which all
internet communication rests. Indirect delivery occurs when th e destination
is not on a directly attached network, forcing th e sender to pass th e datagram
to a router for delivery.
Transmission of an IP datagram between two machines on a single physical
network does not involve routers. The sender encapsulates th e datagram into
a physical frame, binds th e destination IP address to a physical hardw are ad
dress, and sends the resulting frame directly to th e destination. Because th e
internet addresses of all machines on a single network include a common net
work prefix, and because extracting th a t prefix can be done in a few machine
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instructions, testing w hether a machine can be reached directly is extremely
efficient.
Indirect delivery is more difficult th an direct delivery because th e sender must
identify a router to which th e datagram is to be sent. The router m ust then for
ward th e datagram on tow ard th e destination network. Routers in a T C P /IP
internet form a cooperative, interconnected structure. D atagram s pass from
router to router until they reach a router th a t can delivery the datagram
directly.
The usual IP routing algorithm employs a routing table on each machine th a t
stores inform ation about possible destinations and how to reach them . Be
cause both hosts and routers route datagram s, both have IP routing tables.
W henever th e IP routing software in a host or a router needs to tran sm it a
datagram , it consults th e routing table to decide where to send the datagram .
A fter taking into account everything about routing, an IP routing algorithm
becomes:

RouteDatagram (Datagram, Routing Table)
Extract destination IP address , D, from the datagram and compute the network
prefix, N;
If N matches any directly connected network address
deliver datagram to destination D over that network,
(This involves resolving D to a physical address, encapsulating the datagram,
and sending the frame.)
else if the table contains a host-specific route for D
send datagram to next-hop specified in the table
else if the table contains a route for network N
send datagram to next-hop specified in the table
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else if the table contains a default route
send datagram to the default router specified in the table
else declare a routing error;

The algorithm is split around various routines in Linux. The m ajor functions
are as follow:
o in t ip .build,-header (struct sk.buff *skb, unsigned long saddr, unsigned long
daddr, struct device **dev, int type, struct options *opt, int len, int tos,
in t ttl)\
This routine builds th e appropriate hardw are/IP headers for th e routine.
It assumes th a t if *dev != NULL then th e protocol knows w hat i t ’s doing,
otherwise it uses th e routing/A R P tables to select a device struct,
o unsigned short ip.com pute.csum(unsigned char * buff, int len)]
This routine does all th e checksum com putations th a t do not require
anything special (like copying or special headers),
o static struct sk.buff Hp.defrag (struct iphdr *iph, struct sk.buff *skb, struct
device *dev)\
Process an incoming IP datagram fragment,
o void ip-fragm ent(struct sock *sk, struct sk-buff *skb, struct device *dev,
int i s.frag)]
If th e IP datagram is too large to be sent in one piece, break it up into
smaller pieces (each of size equal to the MAC header plus IP header plus
a block of th e d ata of the original IP d ata p art) th a t will yet lit in a
single device frame, and queue such a frame for sending by calling the
ip_queue_xmit().
o static void ip-forward(struct sk-buff *skb, struct device *dev, int is.frag)\
Forward an IP datagram to its next destination,
o int ip.rcv(struct sk.buff *skb, struct device *dev, struct packet-type *pt)\
This function receives all incoming IP datagram s.
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o void ip.queue.xm it(struct sock *sk, struct device *dev, struct skJ)uff *skb,
in t free);
Queues a packet to be sent, and starts th e tran sm itter if necessary, if
free = 1 then free the block after transm it, otherwise don’t. If free= = 2
not only free the block but also don’t assign a new ip seq num ber. This
routine also needs to p u t in the to tal length, and com pute th e checksum,
o int ip.setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, char *optval, int
opt len);
Socket option code for IP. This is the end of the line after any TC P,U D P
etc options on an IP socket,
o in t ip.getsockoptfstruct sock *sk, int level, int optname, char *optval, int
*op tlen);
G et th e socket options.
2. Modification of the existing Linux routing software. New functions added at
IP level:
Several routines are added to th e original Linux IP software so th a t when
any packet arrives, it is examined before doing normal routing. In th e IP
software, there are functions which offer th e different utlities to other layers
of th e leveled T C P /IP protocol suite. They deal with the packet’s receiving,
sending, forwarding, header-building and sum-checking. They are th e only
interfaces between the IP layer and any other layer. A new function ip.fw .chk
is added to these functions to do extra checking. T h at is to decide w hether a
packet should be discarded or not. To make the ip_fw_chk work, some other
new functions are added, too.
The new functions are:
o extern inline int port.match (unsigned short *portptr,int nports, unsigned
short port,int range.flag);
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R eturns 1 if th e port is m atched by the vector, otherwise return 0.
o int ip-fw„chk(struct iphdr *ip, struct device *rif, struct ip jw *chain, int
policy, int opt)]
R eturns 0 if packet should be dropped, 1 if it should be accepted, and -1
if an ICM P host unreachable packet should be sent,
o in t ip .fw .ctl(in t stage, void *m, int len)]
In this function, freeJw .chain, add_to_chain and del_from_chain are called
depending on w hat the stage is.
o static void free.fw-chain(struct ip jw *volatile *chainptr)]
free every element in a chain,
o static int add-to.chain(struct ip.fw *volatile *chainptr, struct ip.fw *frwl)]
add an element in a chain,
o static int deLfrom^chain(struct ip.fw *volatile *chainptr, struct ip J w *frwl)]
delete an element from a chain.
3. T he utility of using th e packet-filter software: th e user interface ipfw.
Actually, there are three steps to set up a packet filter: first, to decide the
security policy; second, express th e policy in a form at th a t the com puter can
understand; th ird , make the policy work. There is no doubt th a t it is very
im portant to let th e com puter know w hat users w ant it to do. It is also the
most difficult part.
In this practical environment, an independent software package, ipfw, is of
fered for users to specify, w hat they want to do. Ipfw m aintains two chains
which are forwarding and blocking. Through these two chains, a user decides
which packet needs to be forwarded or blocked. Add, delete and list are the
three types of commands provided. After ipfw parses a command, it sets th e
correspond socket options and variables.
T he general algorithm is:
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Initailization

Parsing the
Command

Correct
Command?

Show the Usage
What Kind
ot the
Command?
Exit

Remove All
Entries from
Forwarding or
Blocking Chain

List Every Entry
of Forwarding or
Blocking Chain

Forwarding
or Blocking
v Chain? /
Forwardin.

Flush

List

Add I Del

Blocking
Add to or
Delete from
Blocking Chain

Add to or
Delete from
Forwarding Chain

Set Variables

E x it

Some im portant routines of this program are:
o static char *fm tip(uJong uaddr)
change an IP address into th e four oxtets form at.

37

Exit

o static int do_setsockopt(char *what, int fd, int proto, int cmd, void *data,
in t datalen, int ok.errno)
set the socket options,
o in t get-protocol(char *arg, void (*cmd.usage) (ipfJtind), ipfJtind kind)
parsing th e command to get th e protocol,
o void get-ipaddr(char *arg, struct in„addr *addr, struct in.addr *mask,
void (*usage) (ipfJtind), ipfJtind kind)
parsing th e command to get the IP address,
o in t get..ports(char ***argv.ptr, u.short * ports, int m in.ports, int max.ports,
void (*usage) (ipfJtind), ipfJtind kind, const char *proto„name)
parsing th e command to get th e prot number,
o void add(ipfJtind kind, int socket Jd , char **argv)
add an entry to th e forwarding or blocking chain,
o void del(ipfJtind kind, int socketJd, char **argv)
delete an entry from th e forwarding or blocking chain,
o void list(int socketJd, char **argv)
The usage of this utility is:
o ipfw <entry-action> <chain entry pattern>
o ipfw <chain-action> <chain[s] type>
These are th e < entry-actions> :
o a[dd] blocking] - add entry to blocking firewall,
o d[el] blocking] - remove entry from blocking firewall,
o a[dd] f[orwarding] - add entry to forwarding firewall,
o d[el] f[orwarding] - remove entry from forwarding firewall.
These are the <chain-actions>:
o f[lush] - remove all entries in forwarding/blocking chains.
© l[ist] - show all entries in blocking/forwarding chains.
T he < chain-entry pattern> is built like this:
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o For forwarding/blocking chains:
— deny <proto/addr pattern>
— accept <proto/addr pattern>
o The <joroto/addr pattern> options are:

— all|icmp from <src ad d r/m ask > to < d st ad d r/m ask >
- tcp|udp from <src addr/m ask>[ports] to < d st addr/m ask> [ports]
- < src ad d r/m ask > : <IN E T IP addr | domain nam e> [/m ask bits |
m a sk pattern]
- [ports]: [ p o rt,port....|port:port] where nam e of service can be used
instead of port numeric value.
The <chain[s] type> is:
forwarding or blocking.
4. An example of using firewall programs
T h is file is a scrip t file con tain in g ipfw co m m a n d s e x e c u te d on th e
rou ter Linux:

Script started on Tue Jim 20 17:36:16 1995

This command shows th e ipfw usage
# ipfw
us a g e : ipf irewall
1 [ist]

b[locking]

I 1 [ist] f[orwarding]
I f [lush]b[locking]
I f[lush] f [orwarding]
I a[dd]

b[locking]

<type> [iface

<addr>] from <src> to <dst>

I a[dd]

f[orwarding]

<type> [iface

<addr>] from <src> to <dst>

I d[el]

b[locking]

<type> [iface

<addr>] from <src> to <dst>
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I d[el]

f[orwarding] <type> [iface <addr>] from <src> to <dst>

#

This command lists every entry in the forwarding chain

# ipfw 1 f
Type

Proto

From

To

Ports

#

This command adds entry which denies all tcp packets from bsd to telnet port
of fusion

# ipfw add f deny tcp from bsd to fusion telnet
add forwarding deny tcp from bsd to fusion telnet

#

This command disallows any connection from bsd to fusion

# ipfw add f deny all from bsd to fusion
add forwarding deny all from bsd to fusion

This command lists every entry in the forwarding chain

# ipfw 1 f
Type

Proto

From

deny

tcp

bsdunix.net3

fusion.net2

deny

all

bsdunix.net3

fusion.net2

To

Ports
any -> telnet

#

This command discards the entry which disallows any connection from bsd to
fusion
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# ipfw del f deny all from bsd to fusion
delete forwarding deny all from bsd to fusion

#

This command lists every entry in th e forwarding chain

# ipfw 1 f
Type

Proto

deny

tcp

From

To

bsdunix.net3

fusion.net2

Ports
any -> telnet

This command fiushs every entry in the forwarding chain

# ipfw f f

This command lists every entry in th e forwarding chain

# ipfw 1 f
Type

Proto

From

To

Ports

# exit
# exit
Script done on Tue Jun 20 17:44:42 1995

T h is file is a scrip t file con tain in g th e resu lts w ith d ifferen t ro u tin g
restrictio n s on B SD :

Script started on Tue Jun 20 16:20:56 1995

Under th e normal condition, any connections such as ping, rlogin and telnet
are allowable
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# ping fusion
PING fusion.net2 (150.131.252.112): 56 data bytes
64 bytes

from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=0 ttl=254 time=6.719 ms

64 bytes

from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=l ttl=254 time=4.265 ms

64 bytes

from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=2 ttl=254 time=4.300 ms

64 bytes

from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=3 ttl=254 time=4.273 ms

64 bytes

from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=4 ttl=254 time=4.246 ms

64 bytes

from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=4 ttl=254 time=4.246 ms

64 bytes

from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=5 ttl=254 time=4.258 ms

fusion.net2 ping statistics --6 packets transmitted, 6 packets received, 0'/, packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 4.246/4.670/6.719 ms
# telnet fusion
Trying 150.131.252.112...
Connected to fusion.net2.
Escape character is ’

SunOS UNIX (fusion)

login: root
Password:
Last login: Tue Jun 20 14:18:04 from bsdunix.net3
SunOS Release 4.1.1 (FUSION.OS) #1: Thu Sep 26 15:14:59 EDT 1991

/
FUSION##/(1 )>logout
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Connection closed by foreign host.
# rlogin fusion
Password:
Last login: Tue Jun 20 16:27:14 from bsdunix.net3
SunOS Release 4.1.1 (FUSION.OS) #1: Thu Sep 26 15:14:59 EDT 1991

/
FUSION##/(1 )>logout
rlogin: connection closed.

#

After th e command ipfw add f deny tcp from bsd to fusion telnet is executed
on Linux, th e connection from bsd to fusion through telnet is denied. B ut th e
other connections such rlogin and ping are still allowable.

# ping fusion
PING fusion.net2 (150.131.252.112): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 150.131.252.112:

icmp_seq=0 ttl=254 time=5.200 ms

64 bytes from 150.131.252.112:

icmp_seq=l ttl=254 time=6.145 ms

64 bytes from 150.131.252.112:

icmp_seq=2 ttl=254 time=5.324 ms

64 bytes from 150.131.252.112:

icmp_seq=2 ttl=254 time=5.324 ms

64 bytes from 150.131.252.112:

icmp_seq=3 ttl=254 time=5.304 ms

64 bytes from 150.131.252.112:

icmp_seq=3 ttl=254 time=5.304 ms

64 bytes from 150.131.252.112:

icmp_seq=4 ttl=254 time=5.583 ms

fusion.net2 ping statistics -5 packets transmitted, 5 packets received, 0'/, packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 5.200/5.500/6.145 ms
# rlogin fusion
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Password:
Last login: Tue Jun 20 16:27:30 from bsdunix.net3
SunOS Release 4.1.1 (FUSION.OS) #1: Thu Sep 26 15:14:59 EDT 1991SunOS Release 4.1

/
FUSION##/(1 )>logout
rlogin: connection closed.
# telnet fusion
Trying 150.131.252.112...
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: Connection timed out

#

After executing command ipfw add f deny all from bsd to fusion, any connec
tions are disallowable.
# ping fusion
PING fusion.net2 (150.131.252.112): 56 data bytes

fusion.net2 ping statistics --4 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100*/, packet loss
# rlogin fusion
fusion.net2: Connection timed out

After ipfw f f is executed, th a t is there is no restriction on routing, any con
nection from bsd to fusion are allowable.
# ping fusion
PING fusion.net2 (150.131.252.112): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=0 ttl=254 time=5.228 ms
64 bytes from 150.131.252.112: icmp_seq=l ttl=254 time=4.289 ms
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fusion.net2 ping statistics -2 packets transmitted, 2 packets received, 0'/, packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 4.289/4.750/5.228 ms
# rlogin fusion
Password:
Last login: Tue Jun 20 16:28:22 from bsdunix.net3
SunOS Release 4.1.1 (FUSI0N.0S) #1: Thu Sep 26 15:14:59 EDT 1991

/
FUSION##/(1 )>logout
rlogin: connection closed.
# telnet fusion
Trying 150.131.252.112...
Connected to fusion.net2.
Escape character is ’

.

SunOS UNIX (fusion)

login: root
Password:
Last login: Tue Jun 20 16:33:18 from bsdunix.net3
SunOS Release 4.1.1 (FUSION.OS) #1: Thu Sep 26 15:14:59 EDT 1991

/
FUSION##/(1 )>logout
Connection closed by foreign host.
# exit
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Script done on Tue Jun 20 16:30:36 1995

4

Sum m ary

The Internet beckons us in some alluring ways, It promises many advantages in
the way of rewards and benefits — connections with a m ultitude of individuals
and organizations and access to inform ation and resources on a scale heretofore
unparalleled. And yet hooking up to th e Internet can also he the source of significant
dangers and risks.
Security is sometimes an elusive goal and can seem unattainable, especially when
you think in term s of the exposure th a t an Internet connection offers. B ut there are
workable, practical solutions today.
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A p p en d ix

A

T h e m ajor step s to set up each m achin e o f th e n e t
work
o The m ajor steps to set up a NetW are Server
1. install th e two network cards w ith the correct configuration;
2. modify th e files:
— AU TO E XEC .N C F: add the two network cards’ drivers, assign IP
addresses and set the NetW are server’s system variables);
— /etc/h o sts: add every h o st’s IP address;
— /etc/gatew ays: add th e router information.
3. restart the server.
o The m ajor steps to set up a 486 PC running Linux
1. install th e two network cards with the correct configuration;
2. modify the files:
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— / etc/lilo.conf: set the second network card ’s driver in Linux;
— /etc/h o sts: add every h o st’s IP address;
— / etc /rc .c /rc .in e tl: set th e network variables including th e routing
inform ation and IP addresses of the two network cards;
— /etc/sendm ail.cf. set the email configuration.
3. run lilo, which passes the system variables to th e Linux operating system;
4. reboot.
o The m ajor steps to set up a Sun w orkstation running SunOS
1. modify th e files:
— /etc/h o sts: add every h o st’s IP address;
— / etc/rc.local: set the network variables including the routing infor
m ation and IP addresses of the network card;
— /etc/sendm ail.cf: set th e email configuration.
2. reboot.
o The m ajor steps to set up a 486 PC running 4.3BSD
1. install the network card with th e correct configuration;
2. modify th e files:
— /etc/h o sts: add every host’s IP address;
— /etc/n etsta rt: set the network variables including th e routing infor
m ation and IP addresses of th e network card;
— /etc/sendm ail.cf: set th e email configuration.
3. run isendm ail -bz to generate th e file sendmail.fc, another configuration
file for email;
4. reboot.
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B

B .l
B .1 .1

T h e m ajor cu sto m ized files on each m ach in e o f th e
netw ork
T h e cu sto m ized files on th e N etW are Server:
S Y S :/s y s te m /a u to e x e c .n c f:

file server name SERVER312
ipx internal net 2F28054D
load nmagent
;install the interface for net 150 and 150.131.251.0
load ne2000

port=340 int=2

name=ipxnet

bind ipx to ipxnet net=150
load ne2000 port=340 int=2 frame=ethernet_ii name=ipipxnet
; install the interface for 150.131.252.0
load ne2000 port=300 int=3 frame=ethernet_ii name=tcpnet
load tcpip forward=yes
bind ip to tcpnet addr=150.131.252.10 mask=255.255.255.0
bind ip to ipipxnet addr=150.131.251.10 mask=255.255.255.0
;load ipconfig
;load btrieve
;load bspxcom
;search add sys:\mhs\exe
;search add sys:\mhs

B .l.2

S Y S :/e tc /g a te w a y s :

#
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# S Y S :ETC\GATEWAYS

#
#

List of unusual routes which must be added to the routing

#

database statically.

#
# Normally you will not need this file, as most routing information
# should be available through the routing protocols.

#

# Examples.

These entries will not be useful to you.

#net milnet gateway sj-in5

# to milnet through in5.

#net

26 gateway 130.57.6.144 metric 3 active

# route to network 26

#net

10 gateway 192.67.172.71 passive

# route to network 10 is

#host 130.57.6.40 gateway 192.67.172.55
#net 150.131.252.0 gateway 150.131.252.10
#net 150.131.251.0 gateway 150.131.251.10
net 150.131.250.0 gateway 150.131.252.111

#

B .2
B .2 .1

T h e cu sto m ized files on th e Linux
/e tc /lilo .c o n f:

# LIL0 configuration file
# generated by ’liloconfig’

#
# Start LILO global section
boot = /dev/hda
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# route to host 130.57.6

•compact

# faster, but wo n ’t work on all systems,

delay = 50
vga * normal

# force"sane state

ramdisk = 0

# paranoia setting

# End LILO global section
# append the second ethernet card NE2000
append * " ether=5,0x360,ethl "
# Linux bootable partition config begins
image = /vmlinuz
root = /dev/hda2
label = linux
# Linux bootable partition config ends

#
# DOS bootable partition config begins
other = /dev/hdai
label = dos
table = /dev/hda
# DOS bootable partition config ends

B .2 .2

/ e t c /r c .d /r c .in e t l :

#! /bin/sh

#
# rc.inetl This shell script boots up the base INET system.

#
# Version: @(#)/etc/rc.d/rc.inetl 1.01 05/27/93

#
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HOSTNAME*‘cat /etc/HOSTNAME‘

# Attach the loopback device.
/sbin/ifconfig lo 127.0.0.1
/sbin/route add -net 127.0.0.0

# IF YOU HAVE AN ETHERNET CONNECTION, use these lines below to configure the
# ethO interface. If y o u ’re only using loopback or SLIP, d o n ’t include the
# rest of the lines in this file.

# Edit for your setup.
#IPADDR="150.131.250.Ill" # REPLACE with YOUR IP address!
•NETMASK*"255.255.255.0" # REPLACE with YOUR netmask!
•NETWORK-"150.131.251.0” # REPLACE with YOUR network address!
•BROADCAST*"ISO.131.252.255" # REPLACE with YOUR broadcast address, if you
# have one. If not, leave blank and edit below.
•GATEWAY*"150.131.251.10" # REPLACE with YOUR gateway address!

# Uncomment ONLY ONE of the three lines below. If one doesn’t work, try again.
# /sbin/ifconfig ethO ${IPADDR> netmask ${NETMASK> broadcast ${BROADCAST>
#/sbin/ifconfig ethO ${IPADDR> broadcast ${BROADCAST> netmask ${NETMASK>
# /sbin/ifconfig

ethO ${IPADDR> netmask ${NETMASK}

# Uncomment these to set up your IP routing table.
•/sbin/route add -net ${NETW0RK> netmask ${NETMASK}
•/sbin/route add default gw ${GATEWAY> metric 1
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#/sbin/route add 150.131.252.0 gw ${GATEWAY> netmask ${NETMASK> metric 1

/sbin/ifconfig ethO 150.131.250.111 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 150.131.250.255
/sbin/ifconfig ethi 150.131.252.111 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 150.131.252.255
/sbin/route add

150.131.250.0 gw 150.131.250.111

/sbin/route add

150.131.251.0 gw 150.131.252.10

/sbin/route add

150.131.252.0 gw 150.131.252.111

/sbin/route add

150.131.251.0 gw 150.131.252.10

# End of rc.inetl

B .3
B .3 .1

T h e cu sto m ized files on th e 4.3B S D :
/e t c /n e t s t a r t :

#!/bin/sh -

#
# @(#)netstart 5.9 (Berkeley) 3/30/91

#
# These flags specify whether or not to run the daemons,
# and the flags to run them with
rout edf1ags=-q
timedflags=NQ
rwhod=N0
rstatd=N0

# NFSD_0PTS over-rides the default args for nfsd
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# NFSD_OPTS=’ -u 2 5 5 .2 5 5 .2 5 5 .0 ,1 9 2 .1 2 4 .1 3 9 .0 ,4 - t 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 .2 5 5 . 0 ,1 9 2 . 1 2 4 .1 3 9 . 0 ’

# Change the following line to reflect your hostname
hostname=bsdunix

hostname $hostname

# NOTE: If you are using an /etc/resolv.conf file then you may need to
# use internet numbers instead of host names in the following commands
# (e.g., use 192.27.45.1 instead of myhost.domain).

# Uncomment lines corresponding to the interfaces you have installed,
# you may also need to set a netmask if you are on a subnet.
# Some adapters enable the BNC connector if given the linkO flag.
# If you have multiple interfaces replace $hostname with the name or number
#ifconfig weO inet $hostname linkO # WD8003/8013 & 3COM 3C503 w/BNC
tifconfig weO inet $hostname

# WD8003/8013 & 3COM 3C503

#ifconfig eoO inet $hostname

# 3COM 3C501

# ifconfig epO inet $hostname

# 3COM 3C505 EtherLink Plus

# ifconfig elO inet $hostname

# 3COM 3C507

# ifconfig efO inet $hostname

# 3COM 3C509 EtherLink III

# ifconfig exO inet $hostname

# Intel EtherExpress 16

#ifconfig neO inet $hostname

# Novell NE1000/NE2000

#ifconfig peO inet $hostname

# Xircom Pocket Ethernet 2

# ifconfig rnO inet $hostname _remotehost__ # RISCom/Nl HDLC

# Sample hardwired SL/IP connection
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#

linkO

means compress TCP traffic

#

linkl

means suppress ICMP traffic

#

link2

means auto-enable TCP compression

#ifconfig slO $hostname

remotehost__ link2 up

#stty -f /dev/ttyOO clocal
#slattach /dev/ttyOO 9600

# set the address for the loopback interface
ifconfig loO inet localhost

# use loopback, not the wire
#route add $hostname localhost

# configure a default route
troute add default

gateway_

#set up interface card and route table
ifconfig weO 150.131.250.110 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 150.131.250.255
route add -net 150.131.250.0 150.131.250.110
route add -net 150.131.252.0 150.131.250.111
route add -net 150.131.251.0 150.131.250.111
#end of set up

B .3 .2

/e tc /s e n d m a il.c f:

# Copyright (c) 1983 Eric P. Allman
# Copyright (c) 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
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# All rights reserved.

#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, axe permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
# 1.

Redistributions of source code must

retain the above copyright

#

notice, this list of conditions and

the following

disclaimer.

# 2.

Redistributions in binary form must

reproduce the

above copyright

#

notice, this list of conditions and

the following

disclaimer inthe

#

documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

# 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
#

must display the following acknowledgement:

# This product includes software developed by the University of
# California, Berkeley and its contributors.
# 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
#

may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software

#

without specific prior written permission.

«
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS “ AS I S ”

AND

# ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
# ARE DISCLAIMED.

IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE

# FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
# OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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# OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
# SUCH DAMAGE.

#
# @(#)sendmail.cf 5.2 (Berkeley) 4/23/91

#
#

###############*#######################################*###*
*###############*###########################################
#####
##### SENDMAIL CONFIGURATION FILE

#####
############################################################
############################################################

##################
#

local info

#

«##########«######

# file containing our internet aliases
Fw/etc/sendmail.cw

# uucp hostnames
# (local uucp host name goes here)
DU
# (local uucp host name aliases go here)
CU
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# local UUCP connections
# (machines this machine contacts via uucp go here)
CV

#############################
###

Setup Information

###

#############################

#«####################
#

General Macros

#

######################

# local domain name
# your domain here!
DDnet3

# Internet relay host —

machines in our domain that are not

# registered with the NIC will be "hidden" behind this relay machine
# with the '/, kludge, although SMTP delivery will still be performed
# by the sending machine.

Someday this will go away.

DAbsdunix

# UUCP relay host
DRdarkstar

# csnet relay host
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DC

# bitnet relay host
DB

# my official hostname
Dj$w

###############
#

Classes

#

###############

# Internal ("fake") domains that we use in rewriting
CIUUCP BITNET CSNET

######################
#

Version Number

#

######################

DZ1.37

######################
#

Special macros

#

######################

# my name
DnMAILER-DAEMON
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# UNIX header format
DIFrom $g

$d

# delimiter (operator) characters
Do. :*/.©!-=/[]
# format of a total name
Dq$g$?x ($x)$.
# SMTP login message
De$j Sendmail $v/$Z ready at $b

###############
#

Options

#

###############

# location of alias file
OA/etc/aliases
# wait up to ten minutes for alias file rebuild
OalO
# substitution for space (blank) characters
OB.
# (don't) connect to "expensive" mailers
#0c
# default delivery mode (deliver in background)
Odbackground
# temporary file mode
0F0600
# default GID
Ogl
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# location of help file
OH/usr/share/misc/sendmail.hf
# log level
0L9
# default network name
ONARPA
# default messages to old style
Oo
# queue directory
OQ/var/spool/mqueue
# read timeout —

violates protocols

0r2h
# status file
OS/var/log/sendmail.st
# queue up everything before starting transmission
Os
# default timeout interval
0T3d
# time zone names (V6 only)
OtPST.PDT
# default UID
Oul
# wizard’s password
OW*
# load average at which we just queue messages
0x8
# load average at which we refuse connections
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0X12

############*##############
#

Message precedences

#

#####*#####################

Pfirst-class=0
Pspecial-delivery=100
Pbulk=-60
Pjunk=-100

###############«####«
#

Trusted users

#

######«############*#

Troot
Tdaemon
Tuucp

#########################
#

Format of headers

#

#########################

H?P?Return-Path: <$g>
HReceived: $?sfrom $s $.by $j ($v/$Z)
id $i; $b
H?D?Resent-Date: $a
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H?D?Date: $a
H?F?Resent-From: $q
H?F?From: $q
H?x?Full-Name: $x
HSubject:
# HPosted-Date: $a
# H?l?Received-Date: $b
H?M?Resent-Message-Id: <$t.$i@$j>
H?M?Message-Id: <$t.$i@$j>

###########################
###

Rewriting Rules

###

############*#############«

####################*###########
#

Sender Field Pre-rewriting

#

################################
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#R$*<$*>$* $1$2$3 defocus

###################################
#

Recipient Field Pre-rewriting

#

###################################
52
#R$*<$*>$* $1$2$3 defocus

ft############################**##
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#

Final Output Post-rewriting

#

ft######*#########################
S4

R© $@ handle <> error addr

# resolve numeric addresses to name if possible
R$*<@[$+]>$* $ :$i<@$[[$2]$]>$3 lookup numeric internet addr

# externalize local domain info
R$*<$+>$* $1$2$3 defocus
R ® $ + :©$+:$+ @$1,©$2:$3 <route-addr> canonical

# UUCP must always be presented in old form
R$+@$-.UUCP $2!$1 u@h.UUCP => h ‘u

# delete duplicate local names
R$+'/,$=w@$=w $l@$w u*/,host©host => u@host
R$+'/.$=w@$=w.$D $l@$w u*/,host ©host => u©host

###########################
#

Name Canonicalization

#

###########################
S3

# handle "from:<>" special case
R$*<>$* $@© turn into magic token
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# basic textual canonicalization —

note RFC733 heuristic here

R$*<$*<$*<$+>$*>$*>$* $4 3-level <> nesting
R$*<$*<$+>$*>$* $3 2-level <> nesting
R$*<$+>$* $2 basic RFC821/822 parsing

# make sure <®a,@b,@c:user@d> syntax is easy to parse —
R®$+,$+ ® $ 1 :$2 change all

to

# localize and dispose of route-based addresses
R@$+:$+ $@$>6<®$1>:$2 handle <route-addr>

# more miscellaneous cleanup
R$+ $:$>8$1 host dependent cleanup
R$+:$*;@$+ $®$1:$2;@$3 list syntax
R$+:$*; $®$1:$2; list syntax
R$+®$+ $:$1<®$2> focus on domain
R$+<$+@$+> $1$2<@$3> move gaize right
R$+<@$+> $@$>6$1<@$2> already canonical

# convert old-style addresses to a domain-based address
R$+“$+ $1!$2 convert ~ to !
R$-!$+ $@$>6$2<@$1.UUCP> resolve uucp names
R$+.$-!$+ $®$>6$3<®$1.$2> domain uucps
R$+!$+ $@$>6$2<@$1.UUCP> uucp subdomains
R$+‘
/.$+ $:$>9$l'/,$2 user'/,host
R$+<@$+> $®$>6$1<@$2> already canonical
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undone later

R $-.$+ $0$>6$2<0$1> h o s t.u s e r

«################################
#

special local conversions

#

#################################

S6
R$*<0$=w>$* $:$l<0$w>$3 get into u©$w form
R$*<0$=w.$D>$* $:$l<0$w>$3
R$*<0$=U.UUCP>$* $:$l<0$w>$3

################################
#

Change rightmost

to 0.

#

################################

S9
R$**/i$* $10$2 First make them all 0 ’s.
R$*0$*0$* $l*/,$20$3 Undo all but the last.
R$*0$* $0$1<0$2> Put back the brackets.

###################
###

Mailers

###

############*######

######################«######################*##############
###############*############################################
#####
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##### Local and Program Mailer specification

#####
############################################################
############################################################

Mlocal, P=/usr/libexec/mail.local, F=lsDFMmn, S=10, R=20, A=mail -r $g -d $u
Mprog, P=/bin/sh,

F=lsDFMe,

S=10, R=20, A=sh -c $u

S10
R© $n errors to mailer-daemon

ft################*####################################*#####
############################################################
## ###
##### Local Domain SMTP Mailer specification

#####
##### Messages processed by this specification axe assumed to remain
##### the local domain.

Hence, they can refer to hosts that are

##### not registered in the NIC host table.

#####

############################################################
############################################################

Mtcpld, P=[IPC], F=mDFMueXLC, S=17, R=27, A=IPC $h, E=\r\n

S17
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# cleanup forwarding a bit
R$*<$*>$* $l$2$3 defocus
R$* $:$>3$1 canonicalize
R$**/,$*<@$w> $:$>9$l'/,$2 user'/.localhostSlocaldomain

# pass <route-addr>’s through
R<@$+>$* $@<®$ [$1$]>$2 resolve <route-addr>

# map colons to dots everywhere
R$*:$* $1.$2 map colons to dots

# output local host as userQhost.domain
R$- $®$l<@$w> user w/o host
R$+<@$w> $ @ $ K @ $ w > this host
R$+<Q$=w> $©$l<@$w> or an alias
R$+<©$-> $ :$i<©$[$2$]> ask nameserver
R$+<@$w> $©$l<©$w> this host
R$+<@$-> $©$1<@$2.$D> if nameserver fails

# if not local, and not a "fake" domain, ask the nameserver
R$+<@$+.$"I> $©$1<@$[$2.$3$]> user@host.domain
R$+<@[$+]> $©$!<©[$2]> already ok

# output fake domains as user'/.fake@relay

R$+<@$+.BITNET> $©$1'/,$2.BITNET<@$B> userShost.bitnet
R$+<®$+.CSNET> $©$17.$2.CSNET<0$C> userShost.CSNET
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R$+<®$+.UUCP> $®$2!$l<@$w> user®host.UUCP

S27

# cleanup
R$*<$*>$* $i$2$3 defocus
R$* $:$>3$1 now canonical form
R$*'/,$*<@$w> $:$>9$l'/,$2 user'/,localhost@localdomain

# pass <route-addr>’s through
R<@$+>$* $@<®$[$1$]>$2 resolve <route-addr>

# map colons to dots everywhere
R$*:$* $1.$2 map colons to dots

# output local host as userOhost.domain
R$- $@$l<@$w> user w/o host
R$+«2$w> $@$l<®$w> this host
R$+«9$=w> $@$l<@$w> or an alias
R$+<@$-> $:$1<@$[$2$]> ask nameserver
R$+<@$w> $@$l<@$w> this host
R$+<@$-> $@$1<®$2.$D> if nameserver fails

# if not local, and not a "fake" domain, ask the nameserver
R$+<@$+.$"I> $@$1<@$[$2.$3$]> userShost.domain
R$+<@[$+]> $@$1<@[$2]> already ok
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# output fake domains as user'/,fakeSrelay

R$+<@$+.BITNET> $@$i'/,$2 .BITNET<®$B> us er@host.BITNET
R$+<@$+.CSNET> $®$l‘
/,$2.CSNET<@$C> user®host.CSNET
R$+<®$+.UUCP> $®$2!$1 user@host.UUCP

############*#*«##«###############################*#########
############################################################
#####
##### Internet SMTP Mailer specification

#####
##### Messages processed by this specification are assumed to leave
##### the local domain —
##### RFC822 etc.

he n ce, they must be canonical according to

This means that machines not registered with

##### the NIC must be hidden behind our Internet relay.

#####
############################################################
#########################################«##########*#######

Mtcp, P=[IPC], F=mDFMueXLC, S=14, R=24, A=IPC $h, E=\r\n

S14

# pass <route-addr>’s through
R<@$+>$* $@<@$[$1$]>$2 resolve <route-addr>

# map colons to dots everywhere
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R$*:$* $ 1 .$ 2 map co lo n s to d ots

# output local host in userOhost.domain syntax
R$- $l<®$w> user w/o host
R$+<0$=w> $:$l<0$w> this host
R$+<®$-> $:$1<©$[$2$]> canonicalize into dom
R$+<©$-> $:$1<©$2.$D> if nameserver fails
R$+<0$=N.$D> $©$1<0$2.$D> nic-reg hosts are ok
R$+<0$*.$D> $®$1'/,$2.$D<0$A> else -> u*/,h®gateway

# if not local, and not a "fake" domain, ask the nameserver
R$+<©$+.$“I> $®$1<®$[$2.$3$]> userQhost.domain
R$+<®[$+]> $®$1<©[$2]> already ok

# output internal ("fake") domains as "user'/,host©relay"

R$+<©$+.BITNET> $®$1'/.$2.BITNET<0$B> user®host.BITNET
R$+<©$+.CSNET> $©$l'/,$2.CSNET<0$C> user®host.CSNET
R$+<0$+.UUCP> $®$2!$l<0$w> userShost.UUCP

S24

# put in <> kludge
R$*<$*>$* $1$2$3 defocus
R$* $:$>3$i now canonical form

# pass <route-addr>’s through
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R<©$+>$* $®<®$[$1$]>$2 resolve <route-addr>

# map colons to dots everywhere....
$l.$2 map colons to dots

# output local host in userOhost.domain syntax
R$- $l<@$w> user w/o host
R$+<@$=w> $:$l<@$w> this host
R$+<@$-> $:$i<©$[$2$]> canonicalize into dom
R$+<©$-> $:$1<@$2.$D> if nameserver fails
R$+<@$=N.$D> $@$1<©$2.$D> nic-reg hosts are ok
R$+<©$*.$D> $@$i'/,$2.$D<@$A> else -> u'/,h@gateway

# if not local, and not a "fake" domain, ask the nameserver
R$+<@$+.$"I> $@$1<@$[$2.$3$]> userShost.domain
R$+<@[$+]> $@$1<@[$2]> already ok

# Hide fake domains behind relays

R$+<@$+.BITNET> $@$1'/,$2.BITNET<®$B> userShost .BITNET
R$+<@$+.CSNET> $©$17.$2.CSNET<@$C> userShost.CSNET
R$+<@$+.UUCP> $@$2!$1 user@host.UUCP

#########################################*##################
##############################################«#############
#####
##### UUCP Mailer specification
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#####
############################################################
############################################################

Muucp, P=/usr/bin/uux, F=DFMhuU, S=13, R=23, M=100000,
A=uux - -r -z -a$f -gC $h!rmail ($u)

S13
R$+ $:$>5$i convert to old style
R$*<@$=w>$* $l<@$w>$2 resolve abbreviations
R$*<©$->$* $1<@$2.$D>$3 resolve abbreviations
R$+<©$+> $2!$1 uucpize (no @ ’s in addr)
R$w!$+ $1 strip local name
R$+ $:$U!$1 stick on our host name
R $ = U !$-'/,$- $ :$1 !$2@$3.$D ucbvax!user@host .domain

S23
R$+ $:$>5$1 convert to old style
R$*<@$=w>$* $l<©$w>$2 resolve abbreviations
R$*<@$->$* $1<@$2.$D>$3 resolve abbreviations
R$+<©$w> $U!$1 a!b@here -> here!alb
R$=U!$+ $2 here!alb -> alb
# sanity ... should not happen.
R$=U.$D!$+ $2 strip local name.domain

##############«######*########*#############################
############################################################
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#####
##### Provide Backward Compatibility

#####
############################################################
############################################################

#####################################*##########«####
It

General code to convert back to old style names

#

#####################################################
S5

R$+<@$w> $1 strip host
R$+<@$-,UUCP> $2!$i u@host.UUCP => hostlu

#####################
###

Rule Zero

###

####################*

############################################################

#######################«####################################
#####
##### RULESET ZERO PREAMBLE

#####
##### The beginning of ruleset zero is constant through all
##### configurations.

## ###

##########«*################################################
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########*###################*##############*##*#############

so

# first make canonical
R$*<$*>$* $1$2$3 defocus
R$+ $:$>3$1 make canonical

# handle special cases
R$* < © [$+]>$* $:$!<©$[[$2]$]>$3 numeric internet addr
R$ * < ® [$+]>$* $#tcp$©[$2]$:$l®[$2]$3 numeric internet spec
R$+ $ :$>6$1
R$-<@$w> $#local$:$l
R© $#error$:Invalid address handle <> form

# canonicalize using the nameserver if not internal domain
R$*<@$*.$"I>$* $:$1<©$[$2.$3$]>$4
R$*<©$->$* $:$!<©$[$2$]>$3
R$*<@$->$* $ :$1<@$2.$D>$3 if nameserver fails

# now delete the local info
R<@$w>:$* $©$>0$1 ©here:... -> ...
R$*<@$w> $©$>0$1 ...©here -> ...

############################«#####
#

End of ruleset zero preamble

#

##################################
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########«#############«########################
###

Machine dependent part of Rule Zero

###

ft##*#####################################*#####

# resolve local UUCP connections
R<@$=V.UU C P > :$+ $#uucp$®$l$:$2 ©host.UUCP:...
R$+<Q$=V.UUCP> $#uucp$S$2$:$l user©host.UUCP

# resolve fake top level domains by forwarding to other hosts
R$*<@$+.BITNET>$* $#tcp$@$B$:$1<®$2.BITNET>$3 userChost.BITNET
R$*<©$+.CSNET>$* $#tcp$@$C$:$l<©$2.CSNET>$3 userShost.CSNET

# forward non-local UUCP traffic to our UUCP relay
R$*<©$*,UUCP>$* $#tcpld$@$R$:$l<@$2.UUCP> uucp mail

# resolve SMTP traffic
R$*<@$*.$D>$* $#tcpld$@$2.$D$:$l<@$2.$D>$3 userShost.ourdomain
R$*<@$+>$* $#tcp$©$2$:$i<@$2>$3 user@host.ourdomain

# remaining names must be local
R$+ $#local$:$l everything else

B .4

B .4 .1

T h e c u s t o m iz e d file s o n t h e S u n O S :

/e tc /r c .lo c a l:
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#
# @(#)rc.local 1.112 90/09/14 SMI; from UCB 4.3

#
PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/ucb; export PATH
domainname ‘cat /etc/defaultdomain'

#
# hostname now set in rc.boot

#
echo -n ’starting rpc and net services:’
if [ -f /usr/etc/portmap ]; then
portmap; echo -n ’ portmap’
fi
if [ -f /usr/etc/ypserv -a -d /var/yp/‘domainname‘ ]; then
ypserv; echo -n ’ ypserv’

#
# Master NIS server runs the XFR daemon

#
# ypxfrd; echo -n ’ ypxfrd’
fi
if [ -d /var/yp ]; then
if [ -f /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ]; then
ypbind -s; echo -n ’ ypbind’
else
ypbind; echo -n ’ ypbind’
fi
fi
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if [ -f /usr/etc/keyserv ]; then
keyserv; echo -n ’ keyserv’
fi
if [ -f /usr/etc/rpc.ypupdated -a -d /var/yp/*domainname‘ ]; then
rpc.ypupdated; echo -n ’- ypupdated’
fi

# set the netmask from NIS if running, or /etc/netmasks for all ether interfaces

ifconfig -a netmask + broadcast + > /dev/null

#
# If we are a diskless client, synchronize time-of-day with the server.
# Else, if applicable, run the router daemon. Note that for better
# performance, we d o n ’t enable the router daemon for diskless clients.

#
# At the same time, terminate the currently printing line (for prettiness).

#
server=‘grep

][

]*/[

] “ /etc/fstab I sed -e "/~#/d" -e "s/:.*//"‘

if [ "$server" ]; then
echo ’.’
intr -a rdate $server
else
#if [ -f /usr/etc/in.routed ] ; then
# in.routed; echo -n ’ routed’
#fi
echo ’.’
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fi

#
# The following will mount /tmp if set up in /etc/fstab.

If you want to use

# the anonymous memory based file system, have an fstab entry of the form:
#

swap /tmp tmp rw 0 0

# Make sure that option TMPFS is configured in the kernel
# (consult the System and Network Administration Manual).

#
# mount /tmp

intr -a mount -vat nfs

echo -n ’starting additional services:’
if [ -f /usr/etc/in.named -a -f /etc/named.boot ]; then
in.named; echo -n ’ named’
fi
if [ -f /usr/etc/biod ]; then
biod 4; echo -n ’ b i o d ’
fi
echo ’.’

rm -f /tmp/tl
dmesg | grep SunOS I tail -1 I sed -e "s/‘ .*SunOS/SunOS/" >/tmp/tl
tail +2 /etc/motd >>/tmp/tl
mv /tmp/tl /etc/motd
chmod 666 /etc/motd
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# syslogd doesn’t belong here, but needs to be started before the others.
# It needs to be started after NIS, though, so it can find the "syslog"
# udp service.
if [ -f /usr/etc/syslogd ]; then
echo ’starting system logger’
rm -f /dev/log
syslogd
fi

#
# Default is to not do a savecore

#
#mkdir -p /var/crash/‘hostname*
# echo -n ’checking for crash dump... ’
#intr savecore /var/crash/‘hostname*
# echo ”

if [ -f /dev/sky ]; then
skyrc /usr/lib/sky.ucode
fi
if [ -f /dev/fpa ]; then
/usr/etc/fpa/fpa_download -d -r
fi
if [ -f /dev/fpa ]; then
/usr/etc/fpa/fparel
fi
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if [ -f /usr/etc/gpconfig ]; then
/usr/etc/gpconfig -f -b
fi
if [ -f /dev/dialbox ]; then
dbconfig /dev/dialbox
fi
# add the gateway 150.131.252.10
/usr/etc/route add 0 150.131.252.10 1
route add net 150.131.250.0 150.131.252.111 1
echo -n ’starting local daemons:’
if [ -f /usr/etc/auditd ]; then
auditd; echo -n ’ auditd’
fi
if [ -f /usr/lib/sendmail -a -f /etc/sendmail.cf ]
(cd /var/spool/mqueue; rm -f nf* If*)
/usr/lib/sendmail -bd -qlh; echo -n ’ sendmail’
fi
if [ -d /tftpboot -a -f /tftpboot/sun2.bb ] ; then
ndbootd; echo -n ’ ndbootd’
fi

#
# if /etc/exports file exists become nfs server

#
if [ -f /etc/exports ] ; then
> /etc/xtab
exportfs -a
nfsd 8 & echo -n ’ n f s d ’

80

then

if [ -f /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ]; then
# Warning! Turning on port checking may deny access to
# older versions (pre-3.0) of NFS clients,
r p c .mountd
echo "nfs_portmon/Wl" I adb -w /vmunix /dev/kmem >/dev/null 2>&1
else
rpc.mountd -n
fi
fi

#
# if /tftpboot exists become a boot server

#
if [ -d /tftpboot ]; then
echo -n ’ rarpd’; \
rarpd -a
rpc.bootparamd
fi

#
# start up status monitor and locking daemon if present

#
if [ -f /usr/etc/rpc.statd ]; then
rpc.statd & echo -n ’ statd’
fi
if [ -f /usr/etc/rpc.lockd ] ; then
rpc.lockd & echo -n ’ lockd’
fi

#
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# start up authentication daemon if present and if adjunct file exists

#
if [ -f /usr/etc/rpc.pwdauthd -a -f /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ]; then
rpc.pwdauthd & echo -n ’ pwdauthd’
fi

«
# start up the automounter

#
if [ -f /usr/etc/automount ] ; then
automount && echo -n ’ automount’
fi
echo *.’

#
# Build the link-editor fast directory cache.

#
if [ -f /usr/etc/ldconfig ]; then
ldconfig; echo "link-editor directory cache"
fi

B .5

T h e cu sto m ized file /e t c /h o s t s on each m achine:

#
# hosts This file describes a number of hostname-to-address
# mappings for the TCP/IP subsystem.

It is mostly

# used at boot time, when no name servers are running.
# On small systems, this file can be used instead of a
# "named" name server.

Just add the names, addresses
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# and any aliases to this file...

#
# Version: @(#)/etc/hosts 2.00 04/30/93

#
# Author: Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uwalt.nl.mugnet.org>

#

# For loopbacking.
127.0.0.1 localhost
150.131.250.110 bsdunix.net3 bsd
150.131.250.111
150.131.252.111

linux.net3

linux

darkstar.net2

150.131.252.112 fusion.net2
150.131.252.10 NetWare.net2

daxkstar

fusion
netware

50.131.251.10 pcware.netl pcware
# End of hosts.

83

B ibliography:
1. Douglas E. Commer.[1991]. Internetworking with T C P /IP Volume I
& II. Prentice-Hall, Inc..
2. B arry N ance.[1990]. Network Programming in C. Que Corporation.
3. Thom as W. M adron.[1994]. Local Area Network. Joh Wiley & Sons,
Inc..
4. Carl Malamud.[1992]. Analyzing Novell Networks. Van N ostrand Reihold.
5. Charles G. Rose.[1990]. Programmer’s Guide to NetW are. McGrawHill, Inc..
6. Michael Santifaller.[1994].

T C P /IP and O N C /N F S internetworking

in a U N IX environment. Addison-Wesley(Deutschland) GmbH.
7. Evi N em eth.[1995]. UNIX System Adm inistration. Prentice Hall P T R
8. NetW are documentation.
9. SunO S documentation.
10. Linux documentation.

84

